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July 18, 2007
Yesterday, another National Intelligence Estimate was made public, this time on "The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland." The portion of the report that has been made public is meager, consisting of two pages of "Key Judgments" and five pages of boilerplate by way of procedural explanation. Nevertheless, its release was greeted breathlessly as yet another refutation of the Bush administration's policy in Iraq. Of course, every time the Sun rises in the East, liberals take it as a refutation of our Iraq policy, so it's hard to get too excited. And, in fact, this NIE was a snoozer at best. The Washington Post led the pack in hyping the report, in this "Analysis" piece (I think "Analysis" is what the Post calls stories that are reprinted from DNC press releases): The White House faced fresh political peril yesterday in the form of a new intelligence assessment that raised sharp questions about the success of its counterterrorism strategy and judgment in making Iraq the focus of that effort. This is an obvious non sequitur. But let's see what the NIE really says. This is the opening "key judgment": We judge the US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially alQa段da, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and a continued effort by these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their capabilities. Um, yes. I think any American fourth-grader could have told us that. It's a fair paraphrase of what President Bush has said countless times. Remember all those news stories about how a secret report--still secret, I guess--said that we were now in as much danger of terrorist attack as we were prior to September 11? Well, that's not what the NIE says. It says the opposite, in a paragraph that I have yet to see quoted in a newspaper: We assess that greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past five years have constrained the ability of al-Qa段da to attack the US Homeland again and have led terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike than on 9/11. These measures have helped disrupt known plots against the United States since 9/11. OK, let's add that up: the intelligence community is saying that our counterterrorism efforts have made us safer than we were before September 11, that a number of terrorist plots have been disrupted, but that al Qaeda is still a threat. And this is supposed to be inconsistent with the position of the Bush administration? This is one of a couple of paragraphs that the Post and others deem damaging to the administration: We assess the group [al Qaeda] has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Again, the news there is what, exactly? Obviously some of al Qaeda's top leadership is alive, most notably bin Laden and Zawahiri. On the other hand, much of its leadership, like Khalid Sheik Mohammad, Mohammed Atef, Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi Binalshibh and many others, have been killed or captured. The fact that al Qaeda is still in business and has recruited new lieutenants is hardly news to the administration or anyone else; on the contrary, its continuing capabilities are the reason the Bush administration regards al Qaeda as a major threat. This is the only other paragraph that has been taken as somehow inconsistent with the administration's position: We assess that al-Qa段da will continue to enhance its capabilities to attack the Homeland through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups. Of note, we assess that al-Qa段da will probably seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of al-Qa段da in Iraq (AQI), its most visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire to attack the Homeland. In addition, we assess that its association with AQI helps al-Qa段da to energize the broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources, and to recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland attacks. Another news flash: Iraq is the place to which al Qaeda has sent many of its best fighters, because al Qaeda considers the conflict there to be the centerpiece of its efforts against the civilized world. And this is supposed to be a rationale for withdrawing from Iraq? In addition, the intelligence community seems to be singularly obtuse; or maybe this report was written before the "surge" began. The agencies say that al Qaeda's association with al Qaeda in Iraq helps "to energize the broader Sunni extremist community." Well, sure; but al Qaeda has always been the main face of the Sunni "extremist community." This fact seems much more important: Iraq is the place where Sunnis have seen al Qaeda extremism up close and personally. And they haven't liked it. As a result, large numbers of Sunnis have turned against Sunni extremism as manifested by al Qaeda, and have joined forces with us to defeat it. This has been the story in Anbar, Diyala and elsewhere. So the more salient point would seem to be that al Qaeda's association with AQI has served to alienate the Sunni community as a whole. One would think this is a wholesome process that should be seen through to its conclusion. This NIE, like all the others we've seen, is a compendium of conventional wisdom that reveals no apparent secrets. There is nothing in it that would require "intelligence" to divine. Maybe the unclassified pages are more substantive. Be that as it may, the idea that this report somehow discredits either the administration's efforts in Iraq or its broader anti-terror campaign is a fantasy. |